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Abstract Co-management frameworks are intended to
facilitate sustainable resource management and more
equitable power sharing between state agencies and
Indigenous communities. However, there is significant
debate about who benefits from co-management in prac-
tice. This article addresses two competing perspectives
in the literature, which alternately portrays co-
management as an instrument for co-optation or for
t r ans fo rmat ion . Through a case s tudy of co-
management negotiations involving the Karuk Tribe
and the U.S. Forest Service in the Klamath Basin of
Northern Cal i fornia , this s tudy examines how
Indigenous communities use co-management to build
greater equity in environmental decision-making, despite
its limitations. The concept of pivot points is developed
to describe how Indigenous communities like the Karuk
Tribe are simultaneously following existing state poli-
cies and subverting them to shift federal forest manage-
ment. The pivot point analytic demonstrates one mech-
anism by which communities are addressing Indigenous
self-determination goals and colonial legacies through
environmental policy and management.
Keywords Co-management . Forest policy . Indigenous
knowledge . Landmanagement . Environmental governance .
Cultural and ecological restoration . Karuk Tribe . Klamath
River . Self-determination . Prescribed burning
BWewant to manage the forest traditionally. In tradition-
al management, fire is the primary tool, so we need to
get fire [back] on the landscape. And because of our
legal situation, we need to do it with the Forest
Service. We need to be able to do it in a co-
management capacity, to be able to manage public trust
and tribal trust resources simultaneously.^
– Ron Reed, Karuk tribal member
Introduction
Co-management refers to the sharing of management power
and responsibility between government agencies and local
people, typically through a formal agreement (Berkes et al.
1991; Berkes and Turner 2006). The co-management concept
has been developed through common pool resources scholar-
ship, which questions the ability of centralized bureaucracies
and deregulated markets to respond to highly contextualized
environmental management problems and instead emphasizes
the importance of including local knowledge and interests in
environmental decision-making (Jentoft et al. 1998; Ostrom
1990). Although co-management does not apply exclusively
to Indigenous communities, the co-management term was ini-
tially used in court decisions providing U.S. treaty fishing
tribes with the right to Bconcurrent management,^ and has
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since evolved to mean Bcooperative^ or Bcollaborative^ man-
agement (Pinkerton 2003).
The literature alternately portrays co-management as a
worthwhile endeavor that has the potential to transform natu-
ral resource conflicts to achievemore sustainable management
(e.g., Pinkerton 1989), and as a state-driven project that co-
opts community interests (e.g., Nadasdy 2003). With cooper-
ative management, there are always concerns of community or
agency interests being captured by the other party (Singleton
2000). Risks of co-optation are a particular challenge for
Indigenous communities working to achieve greater self-de-
termination, a term that signifies the ability of Indigenous
communities to participate meaningfully in the creation of
the government institutions that they live with (Anaya
1993). This is, in part, because Indigenous relationships with
state-based resource management institutions are embedded
within colonial systems that have historically excluded
Indigenous communities from land management decisions
(e.g., Taiepa et al. 1997).
These issues have informed a key debate in the co-
management literature over the extent to which co-
management arrangements can facilitate more equitable pow-
er sharing in practice. Through an in-depth case study of co-
management between the Karuk Tribe and the U.S. Forest
Service in the Klamath Basin, Northern California, USA, this
article engages with competing views regarding co-
management effectiveness, and addresses a gap in our under-
standing of how co-management processes can evolve to
build greater equity in natural resource management. This
work is particularly concerned with understanding how
Indigenous communities are strategically responding to
state-based institutions, given existing power asymmetries.
My analysis will show how ongoing tensions between co-
optation and transformation contribute to the co-
management process. I draw on these tensions to develop
the concept of pivot points, which refers to existing govern-
ment policies that provide a starting point for Indigenous com-
munities to negotiate meaningful policy change.
Co-management Binaries: Transformation
or Co-optation?
Scholars have emphasized the potential for co-management to
shift norms and transform environmental policy (Carlsson and
Berkes 2005). Two mechanisms by which policy transforma-
tions take place include incorporating local knowledge and
facilitating social learning within environmental governance
processes. By accounting for community knowledge and in-
terests, co-management has been found to produce highly de-
sirable environmental outcomes such as reduced harvest pres-
sure and increased regulatory compliance, alongside benefits
for local livelihoods (Cinner et al. 2012; Jentoft 2005). By
facilitating social learning, where learning involves
Bbecoming a full participant in a socio-cultural practice^
(Lave and Wenger 1991:29), co-management processes can
help Btransform social relations and generate less conflictual
ways of addressing difficult joint problems^ (Pinkerton
2003:70). As one well-known example, Pacific Northwest
fisheries co-management is recognized for improving regional
understanding of fisheries dynamics—in part by creating new
monitoring systems and coordinating decision-making among
nested institutions (Diver 2012; Pinkerton 1989, 1992).
Co-management supporters recognize that not all co-
management efforts are successful, or the same (Agrawal
2000; Armitage et al. 2007; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).
To better understand what constitutes effective co-manage-
ment, researchers have analyzed the conditions under which
co-managers have achieved their goals, e.g., by improving
resource sustainability or reducing social conflict (Armitage
et al. 2009; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Scholars have also
examined conditions favoring Bcomplete co-management^
that achieve more equitable power-sharing (Pinkerton 2003)
or Badaptive^ co-management that encourage evaluation and
learning (Olsson et al. 2004). In addition, co-management
arrangements are often described on a continuum, where the
degree of community participation ranges from more consul-
tative to more community-driven arrangements (Berkes
1994). This approach builds on Arnstein’s (1969) critique of
lower level participatory arrangements, where community
participation promotes the legitimization of status quo
inequities.
Visualizing a Bladder of participation^ for co-management
(Arnstein 1969; Berkes et al. 1991) leads to the question of
how often joint decision-making arrangements reach the
highest rung. Due to the persistence of uneven power relations
between so-called Bco-managers,^ some researchers have
viewed co-management as a tool for the co-optation of
Indigenous interests (Feit and Spaeder 2005; Nadasdy
2003). Despite some successful initiatives, many co-
management initiatives fail to facilitate meaningful power-
sharing, in part because bureaucratic structures privilege state
positions and dominant knowledge systems often exclude
Indigenous worldviews (Deloria and Lytle 1984; Nadasdy
2007; Natcher et al. 2005; Spak 2005; Usher 2000; Weir
2009). In addition, agreements are not always enforced be-
cause this requires sufficient levels of legal accountability,
funding support, enforcement personnel, and dispute resolu-
tion capacity—all of which can be difficult to achieve (Diver
2012; Mabee and Hoberg 2006). Thus, there is a risk of co-
management becoming a tool for Blegitimizing existing
practices^ (Trosper et al. 2012:184) and excluding
Indigenous community interests.
Sharing Indigenous knowledge with agencies through co-
management can also be highly problematic. Indigenous
knowledge systems often have distinct qualities that diverge
from Western scientific standards and dominant policy
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frameworks (e.g., Barnhardt and Kawagley 2005). For exam-
ple, government agencies are not typically structured to ac-
commodate Indigenous ontologies or epistemologies that em-
phasize spiritual relationships between people and the land-
scape. Translating Indigenous management concepts into nar-
row categories that fit within pre-defined agency structures
often results in incomplete representations of complex
Indigenous knowledge systems (Vaughan 2012; Weir 2012).
Furthermore, when knowledge systems diverge, dominant in-
stitutions typically chooseWestern science as the final author-
ity (Nadasdy 2003). Another problem occurs when bureaucra-
cies limit definitions of Indigenous knowledge to the category
of pre-contact Btraditional^ practices as a strategy for limiting
Indigenous claims to land and resources (Vermeylen 2013).
Co-management with Indigenous communities also raises
the issue of knowledge capture, where giving away knowl-
edge diminishes community control over sensitive natural re-
sources (Weinstein 1998). This is especially problematic when
hunting, fishing, or gathering occurs under open-access con-
ditions. As an additional concern, government agencies that
have an inventory of cultural information on file may be less
likely to engage directly with Indigenous community repre-
sentatives, which works against the principles of Indigenous
self-determination and meaningful consultation.
To address the tensions between transformation and co-
optation, co-management researchers have described different
models of how state agencies interact with Indigenous com-
munities. Smith (2013:93) contrasts Bcoexistence^ models
that account for Indigenous interests to Bassimilationist^
models that follow the principle, Byou cooperate, we’ll
manage.^ Other studies suggest that agency-community rela-
tions may shift through the co-management process and yield
unexpected changes in power-sharing over time, as with
Pacific Northwest treaty fisheries (Diver 2012; Singleton
1998). In some cases, Indigenous communities have lever-
aged co-management to achieve incremental gains, such as
creating new Indigenous management institutions that facili-
tate broader community participation in decision-making
(Natcher 2000). Or co-management may shift de facto rights
(rights in practice) that enhance community control, even in
the absence of de jure or legal rights (Galappaththi and Berkes
2015).
Such examples illustrate a politically savvy approach,
where Indigenous communities leverage collaborative man-
agement forums as a strategic advocacy platform for self-de-
termination, while recognizing the limitations of such forums
(e.g., Willow 2015). Bruyneel’s (2007) concept of the Bthird
space of sovereignty^ furthers this idea by exploring howU.S.
Indigenous communities have simultaneously worked inside
and outside existing government structures to transcend zero
sum gain conflicts over territory. This perspective recognizes
that Indigenous-led institutions are always operating within
imposed political constraints, but also asserts that Indigenous
peoples choose for themselves how and when to operate with-
in these constraints (Bruyneel 2007; Cornell 2013).
The pivot point idea developed in this article extends
Bruyneel’s (2007) Bthird space of sovereignty^ concept to
the realm of environmental management. My case analysis
discusses how Indigenous communities like the Karuk Tribe
are simultaneously following existing state policies and
subverting them, despite the tendency of state-based institu-
tions to exclude Indigenous worldviews. This approach ac-
knowledges the ongoing influence of colonial histories, but
also demonstrates a pathway towards greater power sharing—
by locating strategic pivot points within existing environmen-
tal regulations and planning processes. After presenting the
case background, I develop the pivot point concept by analyz-
ing three aspects of Karuk-Forest Service negotiations over
mid-Klamath forest restoration: 1) crisis moments motivating
co-management, 2) transformational moments in the co-
management process, and 3) structural barriers to equity in
Indigenous-state co-management arrangements.
Case Background: Co-management Negotiations
Between the Karuk Tribe and the U.S. Forest Service
This case study addresses forest management negotiations be-
tween the Karuk Tribe and the U.S. Forest Service that culmi-
nated in a de facto co-management initiative, the Ti Bar
Demonstration Project (pronounced TEE Bar). Although the
U.S. Forest Service has not adopted the term Bco-
management^ as official policy (Mitchell 1997:58), the agen-
cy regularly enters into contracts and collaborative agreements
to facilitate joint projects with federally recognized tribes.
This case was selected because of the Karuk Tribe’s combined
commitment to Indigenous self-determination and environ-
mental sustainability, both important elements of co-manage-
ment. This case is also important because of the Karuk Tribe’s
persistence in negotiating to increase access to their ancestral
territory, regardless of having limited organizational capacity
and legal leverage.
The Karuk people come from the middle section of the
Klamath River, an ecologically diverse and mountainous area
near the border between California and Oregon. Karuk ances-
tral territory covers approximately 1.38 million acres (Fig. 1).
Despite a history of displacement, many Karuk tribal mem-
bers have maintained a strong connection to their homelands
(Karuk DNR 1995; Salter 2003). Tribal members continue to
harvest subsistence foods from the forest and river, including
salmon (Reed and Norgaard 2010). Karuk people have also
maintained a longstanding tradition of gathering at established
cultural sites to practice World Renewal ceremonies. Karuk
World Renewal philosophy obligates its followers to take on
stewardship responsibility for natural resources, an important
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mandate for tribal land managers (Karuk DNR 2011; Kroeber
and Gifford 1949; Lake et al. 2010).
The Karuk Tribe is federally recognized by the U.S. gov-
ernment but in contrast to neighboring recognized tribes, the
Karuk do not have a reservation. A small number of tribal trust
lands are scattered throughout the territory, with parcels
adding up to just over one square mile in total area (personal
communication, Scott Quinn, May 28, 2014). This is because
of California state history, which has provided limited oppor-
tunities for the recognition of Indigenous homelands.
Although the Karuk Tribe historically negotiated treaties they
were not ratified by the U.S. Senate due, in part, to the massive
land grab occurring during the California Gold Rush (Heizer
1972; Hurtado 1988; Johnston-Dodds 2002). In 1905, the
U.S. federal government designated most of Karuk territory
as Forest Reserves, now National Forests (Bower 1978).
Because no valid treaty was signed to legally cede Karuk
territory to the U.S. government, the Karuk Tribe continues
to dispute the legitimacy of federal ownership over its territory
(Karuk DNR 2011).
As one ongoing conflict in Karuk-Forest Service relations,
Karuk landmanagement systems that include prescribed burn-
ing were largely displaced from the mid-Klamath region. This
is due to massive social, political, and environmental changes
Fig. 1 Map of Karuk Aboriginal
Territory (California and Oregon,
U.S.) with overlapping National
Forest areas. The Ti Bar
Demonstration Project site is
located approximately halfway
between the towns of Orleans and
Happy Camp. Map by Jill
Beckmann, Karuk Tribe
Department of Natural Resources
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occurring in the mid-1800s and onwards (Bright 1978;
Huntsinger and McCaffrey 1995; Norton 1979). For many
California tribes, prescribed burning, or the intentional human
use of low intensity fire, has been an essential land manage-
ment tool allowing communities to check forest succession
and enhance desired understory vegetation (Anderson 2005,
2006). Karuk people have long used fire to manage Klamath
forests as a mosaic of habitats, which promote a diversity of
cultural resources, including the plant and animal species used
for Karuk subsistence foods and ceremonial regalia (Busam
2006; Lake 2007; Salter 2004). In contrast, U.S. forest man-
agement has been dominated by policies supporting fire sup-
pression, which have largely prevented the use of prescribed
burning (Biswell 1989; Pyne 1982; Timbrook et al. 1982).
Many Karuk people directly link U.S. fire suppression policy
to the decreased production of Karuk cultural resources that
depend on fire disturbance, such as basket-weaving plants,
acorn-producing oak trees, and wildlife species like deer and
elk (Norgaard 2014; Salter 2004).
Following a resurgence of tribal self-governance institu-
tions in the 1970s and 1980s, Karuk leaders have advocated
for increased tribal management authority over federal forest-
lands that overlap with Karuk territory, especially areas used
for ceremonies and subsistence purposes (Diver et al. 2010).
Karuk-Forest Service negotiations have been characterized by
extreme conflict. This includes disputes over protecting sacred
sites from logging such as the G-O Road case (Grieser et al.
2008), ongoing struggles to use prescribed burning for en-
hancing cultural resources within federal forests (Busam
2006; Lake 2007), and problems with maintaining tribal ac-
cess to harvesting areas (Karuk DNR 2011; Norgaard 2005).
In its negotiations with the Forest Service, the Karuk Tribe
has leveraged the concept of federal trust responsibility, which
directs the U.S. federal government to uphold a fiduciary duty
to manage trust resources for the benefit of tribes as distinct
political bodies (Wilkinson and AILTP 2004:51-62). Forest
Service policies recognize the special status of U.S. tribes as
having governments and laws that preexisted the U.S.
Constitution (Mitchell 1997:33). Thus, federally recognized
tribes like the Karuk are legally authorized to hold special
use rights within federal forests. For example, the Forest
Service has confirmed the rights of tribal members to gather
non-timber forest projects for non-commercial use on federal
lands without a permit through its Pacific Southwest Region
Traditional Gathering Policy. With the Tribal Forest
Protection Act of 2004, U.S. federal law also supports tribal
management activities in federal forests when there are threats
to adjacent tribal trust lands. Furthermore, the Indian Self-
Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975 directs
the U.S. federal government to assure the maximum partici-
pation of Indigenous people in programs affecting Indigenous
communities, and to support tribes in developing strong tribal
governments.
Ti Bar Demonstration Project
In the mid-late 1990s, the Karuk Tribe and the Forest
Service initiated the Ti Bar Demonstration Project (Ti
Bar Demo) as a key moment in their negotiations regard-
ing the co-management of priority Karuk cultural areas
within the Klamath National Forest. Ti Bar refers to a
river bar and the surrounding sub-watershed where Ti
Creek flows into the Klamath River near Somes Bar,
CA. Karuk tribal land managers view Ti Bar Demo as
one of their most successful collaborations with the agen-
cy to date. Authorized by an Interagency Agreement be-
tween the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), the project aimed to 1) demonstrate
Bculturally appropriate^ management techniques and 2)
develop effective processes to Bjointly undertake
projects.^ Importantly, Ti Bar Demo was not a pre-
formed project; rather, Karuk tribal land managers were
project co-leads and proposed priority restoration treat-
ments. Through Ti Bar Demo, Karuk managers applied a
new eco-cultural restoration approach to land manage-
ment that included prescribed burning—a significant de-
parture from earlier production forestry approaches. The
project was partially completed, and then abandoned
around 2000 following a Forest Service leadership
change.
Methods
I conducted this case study over a five-year period from fall
2009 to spring 2014. Methods included semi-structured inter-
views with key informants, participant observation, and doc-
ument analysis. Interviews followed the snowball sampling
method, a technique in which existing study participants re-
cruit additional respondents from among their acquaintances
(Goodman 1961). I selected 30 key informants (10 Karuk
Tribe staff, 14 Forest Service staff, and 6 additional commu-
nity members) who played a role in the Ti Bar Demonstration
project or related initiatives.
Participant observations varied over the study period from
visiting for several weeks during intensive research periods, to
attendingmonthly events, to joining regular conference calls. I
attended Karuk Department of Natural Resources (Karuk
DNR) planning sessions, walked through Ti Bar Demo man-
agement and restoration sites with project participants, joined
Karuk-Forest Service field trips, observed Karuk ceremonies
and subsistence activities, assisted with youth workshops on
traditional foods revitalization, and witnessed community
wildfire responses. I also attended Forest Service listening
sessions on sacred site policies, conferences on prescribed fire,
and mid-Klamath community-Forest Service planning
sessions.
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This project followed a community-engaged scholarship
approach (see Diver 2014; Diver and Higgins 2014). I devel-
oped research questions with community partners at the Karuk
DNR and reviewed work in progress with local mentors. I
worked through existing tribal approval processes, and re-
ceived approval from the Karuk Tribal Council for my re-
search proposal in May 2012. I also worked with tribal man-
agers to develop a new research protocol governing respectful
collaborations with the Karuk Tribe. Alongside my research, I
helped develop the Karuk-UC Berkeley Collaborative, an or-
ganization that builds connections between tribal members
and the UC Berkeley community to support Karuk eco-
cultural revitalization.
Results
Getting to Co-management: Crisis Moments
and Resisting Co-optation
BOur policies were very important to the Karuk, because
they didn’t have land. So that particularly added to dif-
ficulties and tension. Where tribes have land, they do
their thing. . . . I think all along [the Karuk] were trying
to establish a historical right to their spiritual places. So
that was tough, because it wasn’t their land. It was
National Forest land under National Forest policies,
not Karuk policies. So it was very hard to know how
far you go.^
– Barbara Holder, retired Forest Supervisor, Klamath
National Forest
The Ti Bar Demonstration Project was a remarkable and
difficult shift in forest management and state-Indigenous rela-
tions, which evolved out of crisis moments and coercive
forces (Wood and Welcker 2008:401) in U.S. forest manage-
ment history (see Diver et al. 2010). In the early 1990s, fol-
lowing years of intensive industrial logging, the Forest
Service was struggling to respond to the northern spotted
owl listing under the U.S. Endangered Species Act
(Table 1). In 1994, the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) ush-
ered in new concepts of Becosystem management,^ which
prompted the Forest Service to hire its first staff ecologists.
The new forest policy shut down much of the existing
timber harvest on public lands in the Pacific Northwest region,
which contributed to a severe economic downturn for timber-
dependent communities. One Forest Service representative
commented on NWFP impacts to forestry in Klamath
National Forest, B[We] went to harvesting 50 million board
feet per year under the Plan. Before, it was five times that—at
250 million board feet per year.^ Around this same time, the
Forest Service was also dealing with large wildfires across
California, Oregon, and Washington (Biswell 1989), includ-
ing an increased number of large wildfires in the Klamath
Mountains (Salmon River Restoration Council).
Initiating Collaboration Through Crisis
These forest policy changes were preceded by a growing tribal
sovereignty movement in the Klamath Basin. For example, in
the mid 1980s, Karuk tribal members and their allies staged
direct action protests to stop a helicopter logging sale in cul-
tural areas on Offield Mountain, a sacred place for Karuk
people. It was this de facto assertion of tribal authority and
associated press coverage that initially compelled the Forest
Service to begin consulting with the Karuk Tribe. Karuk DNR
director and ceremonial leader Leaf Hillman shared his per-
spective on Karuk-Forest Service relations, BYou get to the
point where people respect you out of fear. Not because it is
the right thing to do.^
Following the Offield Mountain conflict, Karuk-Forest
Service relations were at a low point. In the early 1990s, rep-
resentatives from the Tribe and the agency began holding
Table 1 Timeline of events related to the Ti Bar Demonstration Project
1979 – U.S. government confirms the Karuk Tribe’s status as a federally
recognized tribe
1983/84 – Karuk Tribe protests logging on sacred Offield Mountain
1987 – Large wildfires occur across California, and in the mid-Klamath
1988 – Karuk fisheries program begins as a precursor to the Karuk
Department of Natural Resources
1990 – Endangered Species Act (ESA) listing occurs for the northern
spotted owl (threatened)
1993 – Karuk Tribe is invited to join Klamath National Forests (KNF)
Land and Resource Management Plan (LRMP) planning team
1994 – Northwest Forest Plan is adopted
1996 – Forest Service hires ecologist Jon Martin as the Ukonom and
Orleans District Ranger
1996 – Interagency Agreement between the USDI Bureau of Indian
Affairs and USDAForest Service, Klamath National Forest, October 4,
1996 is signed, authorizing the Ti Bar Demo project
1997 – Karuk Tribe begins Ti Bar Demo planning
1998 – Karuk Tribe completes Ti Bar mission and treatment proposals,
which are adopted by the Forest Service
1998 – Forest Supervisor Barbara Holder (KNF) retires; Forest
Supervisor Martha Kettelle (SRNF) is transferred shortly afterwards,
and her replacement does not support the Ti Bar project
1999 – Tribal crews complete Ti Bar Demo willow treatment and forest
thinning/pile burning
1999 – Orleans and UkonomDistrict Ranger Jon Martin departs for D.C.
2000 – The remaining Ti Bar treatments are not done; the planned
underburn does not occur
2005 –Karuk EnvironmentalManagement Practices Demonstration Area
(KEMPDA) concept paper is signed to continue Ti Bar Demo, but does
not result in any project activities
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monthly meetings, often conflict ridden. During these discus-
sions, agency staff offered to appoint a tribal member to the
Forest Service Interdisciplinary Team that was developing a
new Land and Resource Management Plan (LRMP) for the
Klamath National Forest. Hillman referred to the offer as Bone
of the bones that they tossed out^ because the opportunity to
provide input at the final planning stage seemed minimal, but
he volunteered for the job anyway.
Through the planning process, tribal leaders successfully
lobbied the Forest Service to address several Karuk cultural
resource management concerns. With significant pressure
from Karuk Tribal Council, the 1995 Klamath Forest LRMP
established the BManagement Area 8^ land use designation
for Cultural Management Areas (CMAs), including primary
Karuk ceremonial sites and the surrounding landscape. These
areas require a signed Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween the Forest Service with the Karuk Tribe to support
management activities that are Bconsistent with their [the
tribe’s] custom and culture^ (USDA Forest Service 1995).
Before engaging in joint management at highly sensitive
World Renewal sites, Karuk tribal leaders proposed develop-
ing a demonstration project at the Ti Bar area—not a primary
ceremonial area, but still an important place for Karuk cultural
use.
This initiative provides a first example of how the Karuk
Tribe located a strategic pivot point within existing state plan-
ning processes. Despite limited tribal participation in the plan-
ning process, the Karuk Tribe leveraged the Forest Service
LRMP process to establish formal cultural management areas.
This strategy followed the agency’s existing policy approach
of zoning for different types of land use, but it introduced a
drastically different governance arrangement by requiring mu-
tual agreement between tribal and agency representatives be-
fore management activities could take place. In this case, it
was crisis conditions in forest management and tribal activism
that compelled the Forest Service to adopt the LRMP policy
change, which set the stage for the Ti Bar Demonstration
Project co-management experiment.
Transformational Moments: Experiments in Post-colonial
Forestry
BMy great grandmother told me a lot when I was young.
. . . How she got telling me about fire was—I guess I was
about 4 years old—and I was playing with matches by
the stove. And she caught me. She told me if I was going
to be playing with fire, then I ought to be doing some-
thing good with it. She took me outside, and we started
burning hazel. By the time I was 8 years old, I was
burning off big chunks of blackberries just by myself,
even when no one else was home. Keeping control of it
without any water or anything. It’s all about the timing
and the conditions. And the way you light it. You can
move it around and make it take its own energy out of
itself. It’s kind of interesting. So it’s something that I just
did, from 4 years old and on.^
– Bill Tripp, Karuk tribal member
The Ti Bar Demonstration Project was one of the first ef-
forts to bridge the conflict-ridden relationship between tribal
and agency managers in the mid-Klamath. In 1999, tribal
teams working at Ti Bar completed several eco-cultural resto-
ration projects to enhance cultural resources on federal forest-
lands. These included a willow stand treatment and a forest
thinning treatment with pile burning over 189 acres. What
follows highlights some the post-colonial planning moments
that were realized through Ti Bar Demo co-management
(Table 2).
Achieving Joint Management
As a first step to creating Ti Bar Demo, Forest Service leaders
strengthened relationships with tribal managers. The new
ranger for the Ukonom and Orleans Forest Districts, Jon
Martin, was an ecologist by training and played a key role in
demonstrating genuine political will towards Forest Service-
Karuk collaboration. For example, Martin organized informal
events, such as a river float trip, that brought together tribal
and agency leaders. Forest Supervisors had hired Martin to
help the agency understand how to fulfill its new mandate
for performing Becosystem management.^ Given his interests
in ecological relationships, Martin was uniquely positioned to
appreciate Karuk eco-cultural restoration concepts. Martin ed-
ucated himself about Karuk culture by attending ceremonies
and talking to tribal members about how they did things.
Karuk tribal member and cultural biologist Ron Reed de-
scribed Martin as someone who Bhung around long enough
to understand what we were talking about.^
The second step was generating funding for a co-
management project, which would support restoration
planning and implementation by Karuk land managers.
Working with Forest Service allies, the Karuk Tribe iden-
tified a funding source to cover the real cost of a mid-
Table 2 Key steps for the Ti Bar Demonstration Project
1) Strengthening Forest Service-Karuk relationships, demonstrating po-
litical will from the agency
2) Identifying funding and overarching project goals
3) Generating a Bpivot point^ through existing policy: Interdisciplinary
Team co-leads
4) Tribal planning for Karuk eco-cultural restoration
5) Implementing prescriptions with tribal crews
6) Project implosion: losing supportive agency leaders
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Klamath prescribed burning project, since site preparation
required extensive mechanical thinning. Karuk managers
then worked with the Forest Service and the BIA to de-
velop a legal agreement authorizing project goals and
funding distributions to the Tribe.
The Karuk Tribe spent several months developing its
priorities, including Karuk eco-cultural restoration princi-
ples. The term eco-cultural restoration refers to restoring
dynamic ecosystems and human cultures together as in-
terconnected processes. In the case of Ti Bar Demo, ap-
plying Karuk eco-cultural resource management meant
using prescribed fire and other restoration strategies to
actively manage and enhance understory plants and wild-
life that are most important for Karuk subsistence and
ceremonial uses.
A third and central element to Ti Bar Demowas identifying
the Interdisciplinary Team (ID Team) as the primary mecha-
nism for supporting co-management. District Ranger Martin
identified ID Team co-leaders, or Bco-leads,^ from the Tribe
and the Forest Service. Despite the agency’s history of exclud-
ing Karuk people from decision-making, the ID Team was an
established policy framework authorized by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1990 (NEPA) that enabled agen-
cy managers to work with tribal managers as a new kind of
expert.
The co-lead structure was a very different approach
from what Forest Service staff were accustomed to, and
not all were comfortable with it. The Forest Service has
typically used the ID Team format to bring together
agency experts for environmental assessments, and some
staff members resisted the idea of appointing a tribal
representative as a full ID Team member. They
questioned whether the Tribe had the professional ex-
pertise to conduct an environmental assessment. Still,
the co-lead arrangement moved forward under the
District Ranger’s authority.
The significance of the co-lead arrangement was that it
enabled Karuk tribal crews to take on a primary role with
implementing their own restoration projects. By being ‘‘on
the ground,’’ Karuk land managers had the flexibility to con-
duct eco-cultural restoration treatments in a culturally sensi-
tive and adaptive manner that responded to site-specific con-
ditions. For example, tribal crews could strategically locate
brush piles for burning to avoid patches of tan oak
(matsutake) mushrooms, an important traditional food that is
sensitive to fire. Tribal member and eco-cultural restoration
specialist Bill Tripp expanded on the importance of having
tribal crews,
BWhile we were out there, we were cutting hazel. We
were doing different things like that.We didn’t say in the
prescription that we were going to cut 50 hazel patches
per acre. We just said that we were going to cut, limb
trees, and pile and burn brush less than a certain diam-
eter. But just that kind of prescription was enabling [for]
us. We were out there doing it. We were able to do …
[what] … we needed to do to enhance the resources.
Though not specified in the prescription, we were able
to reduce fuels while leaving species such asmature yew
and dogwood that are typically smaller in diameter. So
in that sense, we couldn’t meet the prescription in its
entirety. But we were able to make on-the-ground deci-
sions that reduced potential [catastrophic] fire effects as
needed.^
In this way, tribal managers were trying to find a middle
ground between formal prescriptions and Karuk management
principles. Not all of the crew’s activities were officially ap-
proved by the Forest Service and this was part of what it meant
to move towards a post-colonial planning model. According
to Bill Tripp:
BSowe let a pile get away from us at lunch. And then put
it out after lunch. And it burned out a nice little area
about the size of this room, like four hundred square
feet. That was a little bit outside the scope of NEPA
[the National Environmental Policy Act], but we did it.
It needed to be done. It had been a long time. We
shouldn’t have to write NEPA to be an Indigenous peo-
ple. So I’m not afraid to say that we went a little bit
outside the box, because that’s exercising our sovereign-
ty. We wouldn’t be exercising our sovereignty if we
didn’t stretch those limits on occasion.^
The ID Team strategy is another example of a pivot
point that enabled the Karuk Tribe and its allies to work
within existing rule systems to shift standard policy.
The ID team framework offered Karuk managers a pre-
liminary Bfit^ with agency policy and procedures.
Martin’s co-lead structure then pushed back on the
existing policy frameworks to facilitate a meaningful
decision-making role for tribal members, regardless of
resistance from agency staff.
These elements of Ti Bar Demo co-management all
contributed to a post-colonial forestry approach that in-
creased power sharing between the Karuk Tribe and the
Forest Service. Although Karuk-Forest Service working
relationships were far from perfect, the ID Teams en-
abled Karuk managers to play a meaningful role in for-
est management. By creating additional legitimacy for
Karuk perspectives, the ID Teams facilitated important
social learning opportunities, which led to improved un-
d e r s t a n d i n g among co -man ag e r s o v e r t ime .
Unfortunately, as events unfolded, the Karuk Tribe and
its allies were unable to complete all of the planned
eco-cultural restoration treatments at Ti Bar.
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Project Implosion
The breakdown of Ti Bar Demo began with a turnover in
Forest Service leadership in 1998-1999.Without support from
Forest Service leaders or agency staff, remaining restoration
treatments were left undone. Around the same time that the
first Ti Bar treatments were initiated, key project supporters
Barbara Holder and Martha Ketelle, the respective Forest
Supervisors for the Klamath and Six Rivers National
Forests, left their positions. The new Six Rivers Forest
Supervisor was not supportive of District Ranger Martin’s
approach on Ti Bar Demo or other collaborations with the
Tribe..1 As a result, Martin left the Klamath in the fall of
1999. Martin recalled the course of events:
BWhen I first got to the ranger job, I had a couple years
of supportive Forest Supervisors. . . Midway through, I
got a new boss with a 180-degrees different philosophy
than either of the previous supervisors. The new boss
was very uncomfortable with shared decision-making
and collaboration, especially with the Karuk Tribe.
This was what I would call an old school philosophy .
. . [that] reflected the attitude, ‘this is my ranch and I’m
running it’ . . . And the staff was verymuch in the [same]
mode with my new boss. [In their view] we were the
ones to propose the projects, as the paid professionals. . .
. I saw the writing on the wall and left for D.C.^
After Martin’s departure, Karuk tribal managers learned
that remaining restoration treatments, including the planned
underburn, would not move forward, and the project ID
Team fell apart. This occurred even though the Forest
Service had listed the planned underburn on its official pro-
gram of work. Several years later, the Tribe attempted to re-
vive the Ti Bar Demonstration project without success.
Understanding Co-management as a Catalyst
Understanding Ti Bar Demo impacts in their entirety requires
reframing co-management as a catalyst. As a short-lived ini-
tiative, Ti Bar Demowas only a temporary experiment in post-
colonial forestry practices. The abandonment of Ti Bar Demo
exposed the weaknesses of the formal agreement authorizing
the project, which was highly contingent upon the awareness,
acceptance, and political will of individual agency leaders. In
retrospect, the project required additional accountability mea-
sures to ensure that the agreement would be upheld, irrespec-
tive of changing government priorities or staff turnover. A
greater level of legal accountability or de jure rights are
needed if co-management arrangements, such as the Ti Bar
Demo, are to become more than a temporary space for nego-
tiating knowledge and authority between parties.
However, tribal managers ultimately view the project as a
success. This was the first time that Forest Service leaders had
formally recognized the rights and ability of tribal managers to
manage cultural resources within federal forests. The District
Ranger worked hard to support tribal managers by identifying a
pivot point within existing policy that enabled a co-management
approach. Restoration treatments by tribal crews improved tribal
access to cultural resources by enhancing local hazel and willow
patches for basket making. Irrespective of the Forest Service’s
jurisdiction over federal forests, Ti Bar restoration treatments sup-
ported many Karuk goals, including the Tribe’s inherent respon-
sibility under Karuk World Renewal philosophy for stewarding
the diversity of wildlife, plants, and non-human entities that make
up the mid-Klamath landscape. Facilitating tribal capacity build-
ing, the project generated funding for the nascentKarukDNRand
created much-needed jobs for tribal members. Furthermore, by
increasing the legitimacy of tribal management institutions, the
project supported theKarukTribe in building alliances that extend
far beyond the Forest Service. Working through these alliances
has repositionedKarukmanagers as thought leaders on prescribed
fire at the regional and national level, thereby increasing the in-
fluence of Karuk management institutions across a network of
nested institutions.
The Ti Bar case confirms that co-management is not a
panacea (e.g., Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004) or an end point.
Rather, it is an interim strategy that can support broader
Indigenous self-determination initiatives, particularly when
communities have the capacity to negotiate with state agen-
cies. When it is included within existing policy frameworks,
co-management can itself function as a pivot point, providing
communities with a tool for negotiating power-sharing despite
agency structures and norms that disempower Indigenous
communities, Thus, Ti Bar Demo can be best appreciated as
a component of the Karuk Tribe’s long-term strategy for self-
determination and environmental sustainability.
Attending to Co-management Realities: Structural
Barriers to Equity
BTwenty years ago, co-management was a term that we
didn’t dare use . . . For Forest Service district rangers . . .
co-management implied that authority was being given
away. District Rangers didn't have the legal basis to give
this [authority] away. However, at the time (and still
today), there were ways to share in decision-making
through collaboration and partnerships . . . as long as
the decision-makers ‘up-the-line’ were supportive.^
– Jon Martin, former Ukonom and Orleans District
Ranger
1 Because of persisting sensitivities around agency-tribal relations, I have
identified the Forest Service employees involved by position and not by
name.
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This case study speaks to the deeper challenges of equity
that are raised in the co-management literature. Despite some
of the positive moments with Ti Bar Demo, all interview re-
spondents commented on the difficulties they experienced in
attempting to realize joint decision-making between the Karuk
Tribe and the Forest Service. Unpacking these difficulties re-
veals some of the structural barriers faced by co-managers and
the forces of co-optation that are intrinsic to the co-
management process.
1) Sharing decision-making authority. One barrier to co-
management was a lack of agency understanding of
how different laws and policies intersect to autho-
rize co-management. Some Forest Service staff
voiced concerns about the potential illegality of giv-
ing away management authority vested in their
agency by the federal government, e.g., through
the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act. Some
commented that they are unable to share authority
with tribes due to the agency’s mandate to serve the
broader public. Others were concerned that non-
tribal stakeholders would accuse the Forest Service
of being Bunfair^ or giving Bspecial treatment^ to
tribes. Tribal members note that these viewpoints
position the Karuk Tribe as one of many interest
groups, not as a sovereign nation, a positioning that
overlooks principles of U.S. federal Indian law.
Tribal members and Forest Service staff had dif-
ferent views about who is entitled to management
authority, and where this authority comes from. For
example, tribal members found that many Forest
Service leaders brought a sense of ownership over
the landscape to their position, an attitude that
offended many of them. As one tribal member
commented,
BThe Forest Service is fairly new in the Tribe’s life in
this area. The Tribe has been here much longer. . . and
feels more of an attachment to the land than what they
see as the transient Forest Service people coming and
going. We’ve been through a lot of rangers here. But
each ranger will seem to have this attitude that this is
their district. I’ve even seen it come with rangers on
their very first day they show up to work at the district.
And it’s like, ‘Ok, this is your district? A lot of people
have been here for a long time, long before you even
thought about coming here.’ I don’t know that they’ve
really thought about it or know that they are coming
across as very disrespectful to the people that had al-
ready been there.^
2) Acknowledging tribal expertise. A second barrier was
Forest Service assumptions about the nature of expertise,
particularly the issue of whose knowledge counts in land
management decisions. Even though important knowl-
edge exchange occurred in the Ti Bar case, Western
knowledge traditions privileging Bscientific expertise^
were still valued over Karuk knowledge. Instead of a
collaborative learning opportunity, some tribal represen-
tatives saw the Ti Bar project as a process for learning
how to disguise Indigenous knowledge within Western
science formats.
Part of the problem was a difference in learning sys-
tems. The Forest Service typically hires staff with techni-
cal training, obtained through higher education programs.
In contrast, some Karuk tribal managers had not received
their high school diploma. One KarukDNR staffer report-
ed that they taught themselves how to read and write
when they began working for the Tribe. Tribal managers
were selected for their jobs because they had a Karuk
cultural perspective on land management, which they
gained through experiential learning with knowledgeable
elders and family. They learned the technical skills they
needed on the job. Tribal member Ron Reed reflected on
how this problem affected his experience as Ti Bar Demo
co-lead,
BThey had their maps. They had their titles. They had
their privileged education that provided that [agency]
resource management perspective. And if you didn’t
relate to them on their level of education, you didn’t
register. I felt insignificant. I couldn’t chime in on their
conversation because I developed an inferiority com-
plex. I didn’t understand their catch phrases, acronyms,
or policies. I found out I had better learn this informa-
tion. But what jumps [out] at me also right now is that
we need to make our own rules. We need to assert our
own names, our own maps.^
3) Negotiating knowledge and values. Another barrier was
the difference between federal agency and tribal laws.
The problem was not so much that such differences exist.
Rather, the issue was how that difference is accounted for
given competing mandates (e.g., Hillman and Salter
1997). The Tribe is typically required to Bmeet or beat^
federal laws and policies, while Karuk laws and land
management principles are often overlooked. This prac-
tice places Karuk ways of knowing in a subordinate po-
sition and discourages equitable knowledge sharing.
In its defense, Forest Service leaders participating in Ti
Bar Demo supported ecosystem management, an ap-
proach that aligned with many Karuk values. In addition,
the District Ranger helped champion Karuk management
goals and facilitated meaningful co-management negoti-
ations. Still, making the shift towards valuing non-
merchantable cultural resources and foregoing potential
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profits was difficult for other Forest Service staff involved
with the project. Ron Reed commented on this
disconnect,
B[The sentiment from the Forest Service was] ‘How are
you going to get your money back if you are managing
for acorn trees? . . . Over here, we’re managing a million
dollars worth of timber. But over there, we’re not man-
aging for anything. It’s a waste of time.’ So that’s what I
learned about Traditional Knowledge. It wasn’t looked
at the way it should have been.^
4) Assumptions of objectivity. Co-management barriers in-
cluded Forest Service assumptions around Bobjectivity^
and Bprofessionalism^—characteristics that some Forest
Service managers ascribed exclusively to agency person-
nel. As Bpaid professionals,^ a number of Forest Service
staff felt that they should be the ones making decisions in
Ti Bar process. In contrast to Bprofessional^ agency staff,
tribal members were viewed as being less qualified.
As a related problem, multiple Forest Service staffers
who engaged with the Tribe reported being accused of
partisanship. A non-tribal person working for the agency
said they were referred to as an BIndian sympathizer^ and
felt marginalized at work. One tribal member working for
the Forest Service recalled another staff member referring
to their presence at an internal planning meeting as Ba
conflict of interest^ for the agency. A different tribal
member reported sharing cultural perspectives when they
first started their Forest Service job, but they soon stopped
after learning that this was viewed negatively by their
peers.
Such attitudes about bias—that involving tribal mem-
bers in agency decision-making would corrupt what
would otherwise be a fair and balanced process—are
highly problematic in part because the theory of an im-
partial or interest-free management agency is a poor rep-
resentation of reality. Historically, the Forest Service has
brought its own political interests into management deci-
sions (e.g., Schiff 1962). And as argued by Harding
(1995), all individuals bring their personal interests and
cultural background into decision-making processes, and
it is precisely the recognition of multiple Bsituated^ per-
spectives that leads to more effective decisions.
While acknowledging the high degree of heterogeneity
within and among Forest Districts, and recognizing that
institutional norms change over time, these comments
suggest a history of Bothering^ Karuk perspectives within
the agency. Many Karuk tribal members see themselves a
having a distinct perspective on land management, which
could be useful for both tribal members and the general
public. One individual described the agency’s marginali-
zation of tribal members as a missed opportunity,
BOkay, here’s an opportunity. I work for you, [the Forest
Service]. I know what I need to say to you to commu-
nicate with you in the structure that makes sense for the
Forest Service. And then I also know how to talk to the
Tribe because I grew up as a tribal member. So you kind
of have this bridge. It was never received that way. . . .
the Forest Service felt that because [you are] a tribal
member, that your loyalties lie there. Your loyalties
don’t lie with us, the Forest Service. . . . So because I
felt that the Forest Service didn’t want me like that, I
didn’t push it. I didn’t make a nuisance of myself.^
5) Accounting for colonial legacies. Another barrier was the
Forest Service’s history with facilitating the displacement
of Karuk people from their homelands. Tribal members
readily recall Forest Service policies at the turn of the
century that criminalized Native American burning and
established federal ownership over the majority of Karuk
territory. More recent Forest Service decisions evicting
Bsquatters^ from old mining settlements have reproduced
these colonial histories for the Karuk. Tribal members are
quick to explain that settling on old mining claims was
one of the few ways that Karuk families could continue
living in traditional family areas. This was due, in part, to
the discriminatory practices of government officials ap-
proving tribal allotments, i.e., parcels of land deeded to
individual Native American families.
For this reason, tribal members are often highly dis-
trustful towards Forest Service employees. This distrust
extends to other tribal members working for the agency.
For example, one tribal member in the Forest Service
reported that certain family members view them as a
Btraitor.^ In the Ti Bar case, District Ranger Jon Martin
found that it was extremely difficult to build a working
relationship with tribal members, despite his willingness
to champion Karuk land management goals. As Martin
explained,
BIt was like driving down the highway and hitting a
brick wall. Because [many] people insisted on blaming
me for everything that had happened in the last one
hundred years. It was not really about me personally. It
was about my role in the agency. But that was rather
painful until I figured it out.^
Considering the barriers discussed above provides addi-
tional perspective on the immense challenges faced by Ti
Bar Demo supporters. Even with its positive outcomes, Ti
Bar Demo did not overcome existing power hierarchies or
deeper areas of difference among co-managers. In asserting
their interests with the Forest Service, Karuk tribal managers
often encountered institutional structures and norms that rein-
forced colonial histories. This analysis of Karuk-Forest
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Service relations suggests that greater recognition of ongoing
colonial legacies and the embeddedness of Klamath forests in
non-Western cultural traditions is needed if the agency wishes
to pursue opportunities for healing and reconciliation (e.g.,
Middleton 2010).
Conclusion
The Ti Bar Demonstration Project represents one of the Karuk
Tribe’s first attempts to co-manage restoration projects on fed-
eral forestlands. Although Ti Bar Demo affirms many co-
management critiques, this case also supports previous re-
search findings that incremental change is valuable (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004). Ti Bar Demo outcomes are posi-
tioned in between the extremes of transformation and co-
optation often presented in the co-management literature. In
this case, the Karuk Tribe engaged with existing state policy
frameworks along with their limitations—while simulta-
neously pushing back to change those frameworks and ad-
dress the Tribe’s self-determination goals. The pivot point
concept emphasizes the importance of identifying leverage
points within existing policy as a starting point for negotia-
tions that can catalyze policy change.
Cases like Ti Bar Demo demonstrate how natural resource
management decisions are layered on top of colonial legacies,
which can lead to significant environmental justice issues. Too
often, tribal communities that have experienced disproportion-
ate impacts from extractive resource management must allo-
cate significant resources to engaging with institutional struc-
tures that do not account for cultural diversity. Many tribal
managers would prefer to start fresh and create their own
Indigenous resource management institutions—as opposed
to working within the constraints of existing state institutions
and the relations of power and privilege that are embedded
within them. But creating Indigenous resource management
initiatives in a multi-jurisdictional context requires time and
resources for capacity building, both for tribes and state agen-
cies. As an interim strategy, leveraging tools like co-
management can help build tribal capacity in resource man-
agement decisions, when this approach fits with an
Indigenous community’s broader self-determination goals.
Thus, co-management can be understood as one step towards
increasing equity in natural resource management and realiz-
ing a new paradigm of post-colonial forestry.
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